While modern theories of emotion emphasize the role of higher-order cognitive processes such as semantics in human emotion, much research into emotional learning has ignored the potential contribut...

Previous research has found that people choose to reappraise low intensity images more often than high intensity images. However, this research does not account for image ambivalence, which is presence of both positive and negative cues in a stimulus. The purpose of this research was to determine differences in ambivalence in high intensity and low intensity images used in previous research (experiments 1–2), and if ambivalence played a role in emotion regulation choice in addition to intensity (experiments 3–4). Experiments 1 (...) and 2 found that the low intensity images were more ambivalent than the high intensity images. Experiment 2 further found a positive relationship between ambivalence of an image and reappraisal affordances. Experiments 3 and 4 found that people chose to reappraise ambivalent images more often than non-ambivalent images, and they also chose to reappraise low intensity images more often than high intensity images. These experiments support the idea that ambivalence is a factor in emotion regulation choice. Future research should consider the impact ambivalent stimuli have on emotion regulation, including the potential for leveraging ambivalent stimuli to improve one’s emotion regulation ability. (shrink)

For perspicuous comparison and evaluation of moral positions on life-and-death issues, it is necessary to take into account the different meanings that killing and getting killed can bear in the two dimensions of dealing with persons (intention meeting intention) and handling them. A homicidal scenario in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight shows the possibility of courteous dealing coinciding with lethal handling. The extreme possibility of lovingly affirming persons while killing them, suggested by the Augustinian “kindly severity” ideal for (...) state-sponsored punitive killing, requires the killers’ affirmation of a fleshliness and fallibility shared with their victims; but love can accept killing only provisionally, since it postulates freedom from the constraints that are felt to require killing. (shrink)

This essay examines the logic of greatness attributions in general and the implications of aesthetic positions taken by Hume, Shelley, and T. M. Greene in order to show how the attitude of faith, i.e. a disposition for unbounded personal growth, can constitute greatness in experiences or in objects or occasions of experience. On this basis the role of great experiences in education is elucidated. It is argued that faith takes a distinctively free aesthetic form in the educational frame of reference (...) so that great experiences may abound. (shrink)

We describe the educational character and leadership development processes used by the United States Air Force Academy that other educational institutions may find useful. Our processes include an integrated educational curriculum designed to complement and integrate the experiential learning that results in achieving specific organizational outcomes, co-curricular activities in cadet living, and a specific focus on the ethical development of leaders’ respect for human dignity and cultural competency as well as the mechanisms to assess and refine our processes.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Open Letter to the Enemy:Jean Genet's Holy WarSteven Miller (bio)J.G. seeks, or is searching for, or would like to discover, never to uncover him, the delicious enemy, quite disarmed, whose equilibrium is unstable, profile uncertain, face inadmissible, the enemy broken by a breath of air, the already humiliated slave, ready to throw himself out the window at the least sign, the defeated enemy: blind, deaf, mute. With no arms, (...) no legs, no stomach, no heart, no sex, no head, all told a complete enemy, already bearing all the marks of my bestiality that now need never be used (too lazy anyway). I want the total enemy, with immeasurable and spontaneous hatred for me, but also the subjugated enemy, defeated by me before he even knows me. Not to be reconciled with me, in any case. No friends. Above all, no friends: a declared enemy, but not a tortured one. Clean, faultless. What are his colors? From a green as tender as a cherry to an effervescent violet. His size? Between the two of us, he presents himself to me man to man. No friends. I seek an inadequate enemy, one who comes to capitulate. I will come at him with all that I can muster: whacks, slaps, kicks, I will feed him to starving foxes, make him eat English food, attend the House of Lords, be received at Buckingham Palace, fuck Prince Phillip, and be fucked by him, live for a month in London, dress like me, sleep in place of me, live in place of me: I seek the declared enemy.This brief text was not published until 1991. It was almost published in 1975 in a book of homages to William Burroughs and Brion Gysin, and was to have been preceded with the following explanation of its origins, written by Gysin:In Tangiers in 1970, Jean Genet asked me what ever happened to the English underground newspaper The International Times. When I responded that the editors were having trouble with the law in England because of the newspaper's ads for "special friendships" [amitiés particulières], he exclaimed: "Why friends? Personally, I am looking for a suitable enemy [un ennemi à ma taille]." He then wrote the following text...[qtd. in Genet, ED 9]Hence the anecdotal reason for the form of the personal advertisement. In 1991 the text was published—according to Genet's wishes—as the first page of the posthumous collection of his political writings and interviews, L'ennemi déclaré.1 Such a placement demands more than an anecdotal explanation. What is a personal ad doing as the preface to a collection of political writings? Albert Dichy, the editor of the collection, notes that this text has the status of an exception: "the text that opens the collection does not belong to the group of writings that make up the book as a whole" [ED 331]. Each of the other texts emerges from Genet's involvement in specific political events (the [End Page 85] 1968 Chicago Democratic National Convention, the Chatila massacre) or with named political figures and groups (the Palestinians, the Black Panthers, the Baader-Meinhof group, George Jackson, Angela Davis), whereas the form of the ad that he wrote for Gysin seems to number it among his literary works. Nonetheless, this eccentric text remains the first in the collection—"en tête de l'ouvrage," is Dichy's phrase—and gives the book its title. Rather than serving as an introduction to the other texts, this text, by virtue of its exceptional form, is a challenge addressed directly to the public. Dichy himself is the first to accept this challenge. His editorial notice passes quickly from anecdote to interpretation:The fact that Genet wished to see the publication of his political articles preceded by this precise text has an unavoidable impact, not only on the identity of the author, now partially assimilable to a fictional character ("J.G. cherche, ou recherche..."), but also on the way in which we read the different texts in the collection, now that we have been given the general tone and the note of secrecy.[ED 331]These suggestions are apt enough... (shrink)

Based on an unfinished manuscript by the late philosopher Dallas Willard, this book makes the case that the 20th century saw a massive shift in Western beliefs and attitudes concerning the possibility of moral knowledge, such that knowledge of the moral life and of its conduct is no longer routinely available from the social institutions long thought to be responsible for it. In this sense, moral knowledge--as a publicly available resource for living--has disappeared. Via a detailed survey of main developments (...) in ethical theory from the late 19th through the late 20th centuries, Willard explains philosophy's role in this shift. In pointing out the shortcomings of these developments, he shows that the shift was not the result of rational argument or discovery, but largely of arational social forces--in other words, there was no good reason for moral knowledge to have disappeared. The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge is a unique contribution to the literature on the history of ethics and social morality. Its review of historical work on moral knowledge covers a wide range of thinkers including T.H Green, G.E Moore, Charles L. Stevenson, John Rawls, and Alasdair MacIntyre. But, most importantly, it concludes with a novel proposal for how we might reclaim moral knowledge that is inspired by the phenomenological approach of Knud Logstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. Edited and eventually completed by three of Willard's former graduate students, this book marks the culmination of Willard's project to find a secure basis in knowledge for the moral life. (shrink)

The sublime evokes our awe, our terror, and our wonder. Applied first in ancient Greece to the heights of literary expression, in the 18th-century the sublime was extended to nature and to the sciences, enterprises that viewed the natural world as a manifestation of God's goodness, power, and wisdom. In The Scientific Sublime, Alan Gross reveals the modern-day sublime in popular science. He shows how the great popular scientists of our time--Richard Feynman, Stephen Hawking, Steven Weinberg, Brian Greene, Lisa (...) Randall, Rachel Carson, Stephen Jay Gould, Steven Pinker, Richard Dawkins, and E. O. Wilson--evoke the sublime in response to fundamental questions: How did the universe begin? How did life? How did language? These authors maintain a tradition initiated by Joseph Addison, Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith, towering 18th-century figures who adapted the literary sublime first to nature, then to science--though with one crucial difference: religion has been replaced wholly by science. In a final chapter, Gross explores science's attack on religion, an assault that attempts to sweep permanently under the rug two questions science cannot answer: What is the meaning of life? What is the meaning of the good life? (shrink)

To the French critics who originally labelled certain films noir it seemed that a class of Hollywood products had gone darker during the war years – as though a dark filter had been placed over the lens. Films were not designed or marketed as noir, and retrospectively noir's status as a genre is still unsettled. Yet there is widespread interest today in experiencing diverse films as noir, and even in using a Noir Filter in Instagram and video games. Pursuing the (...) filter clue, the noir experience can be thought of as subjection to a dark filtering of narrative. Image filtering styles can help to resolve not only the puzzle of noir's quasi-genre status but also an issue of general interest in aesthetic experience. The use of image filters makes a distinctively powerful contribution to the experience of a work or genre, or to the cultural dominance of an aesthetic regime, due to the unobtrusive formative role it plays in the economy of experience. (shrink)

Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from rooting. (...) Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction. (shrink)

If the mental is subject to indeterminacy, does this rule out the possibility of psychophysical laws? One might think so. However, Jaegwon Kim has argued for the existence of a kind of psychophysical law that is not obviously susceptible to problems posed by indeterminacy. I begin by introducing a weak and relatively uncontroversial indeterminacy thesis. Then, by appealing to constraints on theories of strong supervenience and to general considerations about the nature of indeterminacy, I argue that even Kim’s laws cannot (...) accommodate indeterminacy. The result is an argument against the possibility of Kim‐Style psychophysical laws. (shrink)

In ancient times, when persuasion played the role of public force, eloquence was necessary. Of what use would it be today, when public force has replaced persuasion. One needs neither art nor metaphor to say such is my pleasure. Jean Jacques Rousseau.

In numerous essays over the years, and most recently in his Meaning, Paul Horwich has worked to articulate and defend a version of the use theory of meaning. At the heart of his project is the idea that the meaning of a word is constituted by a regularity in speakers’ use of it — i.e., by a regularity in speakers’ dispositions to accept as true, to reject as false, or neither to accept nor to reject sentences containing it. A ‘use (...) regularity,’ thus construed, is a dispositional acceptance property distinctive of a particular word and, derivatively, of sentences containing the word. For example, the use regularity constituting the meaning of ‘red’ can be very roughly characterized as speakers’ disposition to accept the application of ‘red’ to observed surfaces if and only if they are clearly red. Of course, the use regularity constituting the meaning of a word can be described in different ways; in particular, in describing a use regularity we might merely mention, and not use, the corresponding word. Furthermore, not every regularity in the use of a word is meaning-constituting. The use regularity that constitutes the meaning of the word ‘tall,’ for example, does so in virtue of the fact that, taken together with general psychological laws and the use regularities governing other words, it is basic to the explanation of speakers’ overall pattern of use of ‘tall.’ Hence, a central claim of Horwich’s use theory is that linguistic use is in general to be ‘unified and explained in terms of a relatively small and simple body of factors and principles including, for each word, a basic use regularity’. (shrink)

Influential moral theories keyed to benevolence (including Mengzi’s and Hutcheson’s) claim a footing for ideal moral benevolence in natural human benevolence. The meaning of this claim depends on how natural and ideal benevolence are conceived and how the two are supposed to be related—as Mengzi suggests, for example, that there is an innate “sprout” of compassionate aversion to suffering that tends to grow into moral humaneness. In any case it is plausible that some sort of spontaneous and consistent human friendliness (...) supports a moral standard of unselfish concern for the well-being of others. The premise of benevolence theory is strengthened when we take account of a largely overlooked form of general good will: benevolent interest in the efforts of others. Here too a form of moral benevolence may grow from a base in natural good will, a point anticipated in Aristotle’s observation that our friendly interest in others is stimulated by the contestants in sports events. The sports spectator act of “pulling for” contestants, though conflicted by competition and exploited for various nonmoral satisfactions, is a vivid specimen of a general pulling for all innocent efforts in an inclusive moral fellowship of triers. (shrink)

Kant’s central notion of a “causality of freedom” seems inconsistent with his theoretical analysis of causation. Because of its detachment from any reference to time, it is also seriously in tension with ordinary moral ideals of individuality, efficacy, responsiveness, and personal growth in the exercise of freedom. I suggest a way of conceiving moral freedom that avoids the absurdity of practical timelessness while preserving the main strengths of Kant’s theories of theoretical and practical meaning, including his refusal to specify the (...) content of human fulfillment. Much as Kant’s ideal of the highest good combines the supreme good of moral virtue with its necessarily desired complement of worthy happiness, a Kantian ideal of the fullest freedom can combine the transcendental freedom of the moral disposition with individual exercises of freedom in the dramatic interaction of actual moral community. (shrink)

This book illuminates the aesthetically underrated meaningfulness of particular elements in works of art and aesthetic experiences generally. Beginning from the idea of "hooks" in popular song, the book identifies experiences of special liveliness that are of enduring interest, supporting contemplation and probing discussion. When hooks are placed in the foreground of aesthetic experience, so is an enthusiastic “grabbing back” by the experiencer who forms a quasi-personal bond with the beloved singular moment and is probably inclined to share this still-evolving (...) realization of value with others. This book presents numerous models of enthusiastic “grabbing back” that are art-critically motivated to explain how hooks achieve their effects and philosophically motivated to discover how hooks and hook appreciation contribute to a more ideally desirable life. Framing hook appreciation with a defensible general model of aesthetic experience, this book gives an unprecedented demonstration of the substantial aesthetic and philosophical interest of hook-centered inquiry. (shrink)

Although Emmanuel Levinas later expressed regret that he sided with Martin Heidegger rather than the more “ideal”-minded Ernst Cassirer in their 1929 Davos encounter, Cassirer’s philosophy of culture would never have been an apt framework for Levinas’s own project, which was always directed more to fundamental orientation than to formative activities or achievements. In “Meaning and Sense” (1964), Levinas conceived a totalizing cultural “meaning” as a foil to transcendent ethical “sense.” In a 1983 paper, however, he proposed an ethical conception (...) of culture. He could have developed this further using another element from “Meaning and Sense,” an ethical conception of work as service of the Other. The work-in-progress of culture combines pure ethics and implemented morality, pure command and consistent style, infinite vulnerability and actual power. (shrink)

A historically responsible agent is willing to be somehow in practical solidarity with all other actors with whom action is shared over time. The responsible idea of a most-inclusive history encompasses future occurrence together with all that has happened already. Despite our lack of control over future developments, we assess possible future ages as bright or dark and position ourselves as contributors to multigenerational endeavors that we hope will be long-term successes in themselves and part of a larger historical optimality. (...) Informed by the evolutionary sciences, a plausible modern envisioning of the future must include evolutionary innovations and surprises on a very long time scale. The historically responsible agent will therefore take seriously efforts like Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men to imagine the new powers and goals of our distantly posthuman future sharers in history. (shrink)

Modern law and economics received much of its impetus from Ronald Coase's analysis in ‘The Problem of Social Cost,’ and a goodly amount of that comes from the Coase theorem, which states that, absent transaction costs, externalities will be efficiently resolved through bargaining. The fact that the analysis that came to be codified in the Coase theorem was an exercise in pure fiction on Coase's part did not deter the erection of a substantial edifice of positive and normative analysis on (...) this foundation, nor, for that matter, has subsequent elaboration of Coase's intent done anything to abate the interest in the theorem and its implications. (shrink)

Once upon a time, I attempted to create a web-based one-stop-shop for global poverty relief called the Maximin Project. Drawing on aspects of that experience, I show that although some existing ways of rating and recommending charities are significantly better than others, there remain certain challenges that need to be overcome. Specifically, I argue that the emerging Effective Altruism movement, with its emphasis on measurable effectiveness, runs the risk of neglecting a whole range of projects that are necessary for a (...) well-rounded approach to human development. I briefly model an alternative virtue-based approach that calls on the personal insight of individual researchers and practitioners in addition to the more directly experimental approach of organizations like GiveWell. (shrink)

If the mental is subject to indeterminacy, does this rule out the possibility of psychophysical laws? One might think so. However, Jaegwon Kim has argued for the existence of a kind of psychophysical law that is not obviously susceptible to problems posed by indeterminacy. I begin by introducing a weak and relatively uncontroversial indeterminacy thesis. Then, by appealing to constraints on theories of strong supervenience and to general considerations about the nature of indeterminacy, I argue that even Kim’s laws cannot (...) accommodate indeterminacy. The result is an argument against the possibility of Kim‐Style psychophysical laws. (shrink)

A concept of merit is used for spiritual accounting in many religious traditions, seemingly a substantial point of connection between religion and ordinary morality. Teachings of “merit transfer” (as in Buddhism and Roman Catholicism) might make us doubt this connection since they violate the principle that merit must be earned. If we examine the structure of ordinary schemes of desert, however, we find that personal worth is posited for a variety of reasons; the basic requirement in this realm is not (...) earning by individuals but rather a community’s program for cultivating desirable collaboration among its members. There are strong enough parallels between religiously envisioned merit transfer and socially normal conferrals and sharings of worth that we can conclude that the religious posits of transferred merit are indeed comprehensible as merit, whatever other problems of comprehensibility they pose. (shrink)

Past research has found that skin colouration, particularly facial redness, influences the perceived health and emotional state of target individuals. In the current work, we explore several extensions of this past research. In Experiment 1, we manipulated facial redness incrementally on neutral and angry faces and had participants rate each face for anger and health. Different red effects emerged, as perceived anger increased in a linear manner as facial redness increased. Health ratings instead showed a curvilinear trend, as both extreme (...) paleness and redness were rated as less healthy than moderate levels of red. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings by manipulating the masculinity of both angry and neutral faces that varied in redness. The results found the effect of red on perceived anger and health was moderated by masculine face structure. Collectively, these results show that facial redness has context dependent effects that vary based on facial expression, appearance, and differentially impact ratings of emotional states and health. (shrink)